UPSC GS Paper II: Parliament, Anti-Defection Law, 10th Schedule, Speaker's Role

Must?Know

• 10th Schedule inserted by 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985; came into force on 1 March 1985 to combat political defections.
• 10th Schedule applies to both Parliament and state legislatures; covers defection by Members of Parliament (MPs) and Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs).
• Grounds for disqualification under 10th Schedule: voluntary resignation from party membership, voting or abstaining contrary to party whip, joining another party after election.
• Defection due to merger of a party requires at least two-thirds of the legislature party to join; merger recognized if party itself merges with another.
• Presiding officer (Speaker/Chairman) decides on disqualification under 10th Schedule; decision subject to judicial review under Article 32 and 226.
• Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachilhu (1992): Supreme Court upheld constitutional validity of 10th Schedule but struck down finality clause (paragraph 7), allowing judicial review.
• Paragraph 7 originally made Speaker’s decision final and conclusive; SC ruled it violated basic structure by removing judicial oversight.
• Speaker’s role in anti-defection cases criticized for bias due to political affiliation; several instances of delayed decisions during political crises.
• Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994): SC clarified that "voluntarily giving up membership" does not require formal resignation; conduct can imply intent.
• G. Viswanathan v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly (1996): SC held that Speaker must act on disqualification petition within reasonable time; inaction not permitted.
• 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003: reduced threshold for merger from one-half to two-thirds of members; aimed to prevent misuse of merger clause.
• 91st Amendment also added Article 75(1A) and 164(1A) limiting size of Council of Ministers to 15% of total strength of House.
• 10th Schedule does not apply to pre-poll alliances; parties in coalition can merge post-election without attracting disqualification if two-thirds agree.
• NABARD v. Umesh Kumar (1993): SC ruled that disqualification under 10th Schedule is not a punishment but a constitutional disqualification.
• 10th Schedule does not apply to nomination members (nominated by President/Governor); they can join a party within six months of taking seat.
• Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya (2007): SC emphasized that Speaker must act impartially and not delay decision on disqualification.
• Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016): SC ruled that Speaker cannot entertain disqualification petitions during ongoing floor test; timing matters.
• 10th Schedule does not cover split; split was earlier allowed under Tenth Schedule before 91st Amendment removed "split" as a valid ground.
• M. S. M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha (1959): established doctrine of parliamentary privilege; later referenced in Speaker’s authority under anti-defection.
• Anti-defection law does not apply to presidential and vice-presidential elections; voting in Rajya Sabha elections governed by party whip.
• 10th Schedule allows exemption for party whip in case of motion of no confidence, censure motion, or financial matters if party permits independent voting.
• Jharkhand Mukti Morcha v. Dharmpal Singh (2021): SC reiterated that Speaker must decide disqualification petitions within three months.
• 10th Schedule does not define "whip"; practice follows parliamentary conventions; violation of whip leads to disqualification if direction is issued.
• Anti-defection law applies only after a member is elected; pre-election switching does not attract disqualification.

Difficulty Level

Intermediate – frequent appearance in prelims and mains, but nuanced interpretation by courts and procedural delays make application complex.

Common UPSC Traps

Trap: The Speaker’s decision under the 10th Schedule is final and not subject to judicial review – Fact: Kihoto Hollohan (1992) ruled that judicial review is available under Articles 32 and 226; paragraph 7 was struck down.

Trap: A legislator can be disqualified for defection only if they formally resign from the party – Fact: Ravi S. Naik (1994) held that conduct indicating departure (e.g., public criticism, joining rival party) suffices; formal resignation not mandatory.

Trap: The 10th Schedule allows split in a legislature party – Fact: Split was permitted under original 10th Schedule but removed by 91st Amendment (2003); only merger with two-thirds support is valid.

Trap: Nominated members are bound by anti-defection law immediately – Fact: Nominated members can join any political party within six months of taking their seat without attracting disqualification.

Trap: The 10th Schedule applies to internal party disagreements – Fact: Mere dissent or factionalism within a party does not amount to defection unless voting or abstaining against official whip.

Practice MCQs

Question: Consider the following statements regarding the 10th Schedule of the Indian Constitution:

1. It was introduced through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985.

2. The decision of the Speaker on disqualification under the 10th Schedule is final and not subject to judicial review.

3. A merger of a political party is valid if supported by one-half of its legislative party.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
A) 1 only
B) 1 and 2 only
C) 1 and 3 only
D) 1, 2 and 3
Answer: A
Explanation: Statement 1 is correct; 10th Schedule inserted by 52nd Amendment, 1985. Statement 2 is incorrect; Kihoto Hollohan (1992) allows judicial review. Statement 3 is incorrect; merger requires two-thirds support post-91st Amendment.
Why others fail: Option B is tempting because many believe Speaker’s decision is final due to original paragraph 7.

Question: Under the 10th Schedule of the Constitution, which of the following actions by a legislator will NOT lead to disqualification?
A) Voting against the party whip in a no-confidence motion
B) Abstaining from voting in a budget session without party permission
C) Joining another political party after six months of election
D) Publicly criticizing the party leadership but voting as per whip
Answer: D
Explanation: Mere criticism without violating whip does not constitute defection; disqualification arises only on voting or abstaining contrary to directions.
Why others fail: Option A is tempting because no-confidence motions are important, but whip applies unless party exempts.

Question: The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003, introduced changes to the 10th Schedule. Which of the following is NOT a feature of this amendment?
A) Reduced the threshold for merger from one-half to two-thirds
B) Introduced a ceiling on the size of Council of Ministers
C) Exempted split as a valid ground for avoiding disqualification
D) Made judicial review of Speaker’s decision mandatory
Answer: D
Explanation: 91st Amendment did not make judicial review mandatory; it was already established by Kihoto Hollohan (1992).
Why others fail: Option C is tempting as split was removed, but the amendment did not "exempt" split; it deleted split as a ground.

Question: With reference to nominated members of the Rajya Sabha, which of the following is correct under the 10th Schedule?
A) They cannot join any political party after nomination
B) They can join a political party within six months of taking their seat
C) They are immediately disqualified if they attend party meetings
D) They are not covered by the 10th Schedule at all
Answer: B
Explanation: Nominated members can join any political party within six months of taking their seat without attracting disqualification.
Why others fail: Option D is tempting because nominated members have different rules, but 10th Schedule does apply after six months.

Question: Which of the following cases ruled that the Speaker must decide disqualification petitions under the 10th Schedule within a reasonable time?
A) Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachilhu
B) G. Viswanathan v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly
C) Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India
D) Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker
Answer: B
Explanation: G. Viswanathan (1996) held that Speaker cannot indefinitely delay decision on disqualification petitions.
Why others fail: Option A is tempting as it is the landmark case on judicial review, but timing was not the core issue.

Last?Minute Revision

• 52nd Amendment Act, 1985 – introduced 10th Schedule.
• 91st Amendment Act, 2003 – reduced merger threshold to two-thirds.
• Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachilhu (1992) – judicial review allowed; paragraph 7 struck down.
• Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994) – "voluntarily giving up membership" includes conduct.
• G. Viswanathan v. Speaker, TN (1996) – Speaker must decide within reasonable time.
• Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) – Speaker cannot act during floor test.
• Jharkhand Mukti Morcha v. Dharmpal Singh (2021) – three-month deadline for decision.
• 10th Schedule does not apply to nominated members for first six months.
• Merger requires two-thirds of legislative party, not just party leadership.
• Split was removed as a ground by 91st Amendment.
• Anti-defection law applies to both Lok Sabha and state assemblies.
• Speaker is the deciding authority under 10th Schedule.
• Chairman decides in case of Rajya Sabha and state legislative councils.
• Decision under 10th Schedule is subject to judicial review.
• Defection includes voting or abstaining against party whip.
• Whip must be issued in writing for disqualification to apply.
• No disqualification for independent members joining a party post-election.
• Nominated members can join party within six months.
• 10th Schedule does not cover pre-poll alliances.
• Anti-defection does not apply to presidential elections.
• Speaker’s political bias is a major concern in disqualification cases.
• Delay in decision often used as political tool.
• 91st Amendment also capped Council of Ministers at 15%.
• No-confidence motions are not exempt from whip unless party allows.
• Verify from standard source: exact timeline for Speaker’s decision (no statutory deadline).