Post-World War II Developments

Emergence of Two Power Blocs And Cold War

The spirit of cooperation between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union was already being deflated by verbal salvos in 1945. Truman denounced the establishment of new governments through force, a clear attack on Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. In February 1946, Stalin described the Western democracies as enemies of communism. In March 1946, Churchill attacked Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and warned against Communist subversion. He described a Russian iron curtain 'dividing a free and democratic West from an East under totalitarian rule.'

These accusations focused mainly on developments in Eastern Europe. The United States and its allies felt that wartime agreements and a sense of justice should compel the Soviet Union to allow free elections in Eastern European states, all of which should be independent from Soviet control. The Soviet Union felt that these same wartime agreements and a higher sense of justice recognised the overriding need for the Soviet Union to make sure Eastern European states remained friendly and under Soviet influence. The United States became increasingly outraged when developments in Eastern Europe seemed to go Stalin's way. In 1945, the Soviets were already exerting control over the governments of Romania and Poland, despite the protests of the British and Americans. By 1947, Soviet dominance in these two countries was solidified and spreading to other Eastern European countries. In 1948, Soviet threats forced non-Communist leaders out of the Czechoslovakian government, placing that country in Communist hands. By 1950, all the states of Eastern Europe were controlled by Communists and, with the exception of Yugoslavia under Tito, were dominated by the Soviet Union.

Struggles over Eastern Europe spread to Western Europe, where strong Communist parties in France and Italy pursued policies approved by Moscow. The United States and its allies feared these parties would subvert non-Communist governments and help spread Soviet control further south and west.

The verbal denunciations and discord over events in Europe were accompanied by a breakdown of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. President Truman, who succeeded Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, was in favour of a tougher policy toward the Soviet Union. In May, he cut off aid to the Soviet Union. When the possibility of international control of atomic weapons arose, the Americans and Russians could not agree. This led to the nuclear weapons race, which has flourished ever since. The breakdown of cooperation was most striking in Germany. In accordance with the Potsdam agreements, most of Germany was divided into four occupation zones: American, Russian, British, and French. Berlin, which was in the Russian zone, was divided into four sectors and made headquarters of a four-power coordinating commission. Sharp cleavages soon developed among the occupying powers, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, having suffered more at the hands of Germany during World Wars I and II than any other major nation, was determined to keep Germany permanently weak and as much as possible under Soviet domination. The United States, on the other hand, having little fear of Germany and seeing it as a valuable potential ally against the Soviet Union, soon set out to restore and rearm the nation. Matters came to a head in 1948–49. In March 1948, the United States, having succeeded in merging the three western zones and stepping up their economy to a level much higher than that agreed upon at Potsdam, announced plans for the creation of an independent West German state. To the Soviet leaders, this was the last straw. They attempted to dissuade the western powers from going ahead with the project by blockading the three western zones of Berlin in the hope of starving them out. For eleven months, from June 1948 to May 1949, the Soviets stopped all land traffic across their zone from the West to Berlin. The western powers defeated the blockade through a giant airlift. The United States proceeded to set up the German Federal Republic, which began to function in September 1949. One month later, the Soviet Union set up the German Democratic Republic in its zone.

Policies initiated in 1947 raised the Cold War to a higher level. The immediate occasion prompting the United States to inaugurate a new and harsher policy toward the Soviet Union was the situation in Greece and Turkey, both of which were under severe Soviet pressure. In February 1947, the British government, which had been supporting both Greece and Turkey with troops and money since the end of the war, announced that after March 31, it would be unable to continue to do so. On March 12, 1947, President Truman appeared before Congress and requested authorisation to send American military and civilian personnel into Greece and Turkey. 'I believe', he said, 'that it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures'. He asked for $400 million to implement the new program and warned that this was only a starter. Congress greeted this announcement with a standing ovation.

The new policy, which was soon called the 'Truman Doctrine', meant that the United States would draw a military ring around the Soviet Union and its satellites from Manchuria to Norway. It was the policy of military containment. All real diplomatic negotiations between the United States and the Soviet

Union, of course, ceased immediately. The Soviet Union made no further pretense of withdrawing from the areas of Eastern Europe occupied by its troops; instead, the Soviet Union tightened the iron curtain that it had drawn around them.

In June 1947, Secretary of State General George Marshall supplemented the Truman Doctrine with the 'Marshall Plan': This plan was an offer of comprehensive economic aid to all European countries (except Fascist Spain) who would improve their economies, stabilise their currencies, and cooperate with each other in bringing about general economic recovery. All the countries of Europe except the Soviet Union and its satellites hastened to accept Marshall's terms and American aid. The Soviet Union regarded the Marshall Plan as an American scheme to shore up Europe's and its own tottering Capitalism, to lure away the Soviet satellites, and to make the European countries economic dependencies of the United States. The Soviet Union, therefore, forbade the countries of Eastern Europe under its control or influence to participate. Congress voted $5.3 billion as the first of four installments totalling some $17 billion for Marshall Plan aid. In 1949, the United States took the initiative in organising the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was a firm military alliance among the United States, Canada, and most of the nations of Western Europe against the Soviet Union.

In the fall of 1947, the Soviet Union began a series of vigorous moves to counter the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. In September 1947, the Soviet Union set up the Communist Information Bureau, or Cominform, to coordinate policies of the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. This agency was in reality a restoration of the old Comintern, which was the Communist International working for world revolution. The following year the Cominform was supplemented by the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, a Soviet Marshall Plan. At the same time, the Soviet Union severely tightened its grip on its satellites. The local Communist parties were rigorously purged of moderates and national patriots. The Soviet Union strengthened military ties with its allies, eventually countering NATO with the establishment of the Warsaw Pact organization in 1955. By 1950, one stage of the Cold War was completed. Europe was clearly divided into a Communist camp in the East under the control of the Soviet Union and a non-Communist camp in the West under the leadership of the United States.

The Cold War would continue in different ways and with varying intensity over the next four decades. Both sides were pitted against each other in a worldwide war of propaganda. Political struggles almost anywhere, whether purely internal matters or not, became potential fields for victory or defeat in a Cold War competition. This competition expanded to the non-Western world and to a variety of fields not usually thought of as political, from the exploration of space to the Olympic games. In 1950, the Korean War shifted the focus of the Cold War from Europe to the non-Western world. It also revealed how real the risk of military combat was in the struggle between Communist and non-Communist forces. In the mid-1950s, there were some signs of relaxation in the Cold War. Stalin died in 1953, and later that year an armistice was signed in Korea. The Soviet government made overtures to the United States to end the Cold War. In 1955, Soviet troops left Austria, which became an independent, neutral state. That same year a conference was held in Geneva between the leaders of Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Little of substance was accomplished, but at least it symbolised an effort to solve problems peacefully. Talk of 'peaceful coexistence' between the superpowers became popular and seemed confirmed when the two powers agreed to talks for a nuclear test ban treaty in 1958.

This apparent thaw in the Cold War was mitigated by some chilling developments. In the same year that Stalin died, John Foster Dulles became United States secretary of state in the new Eisenhower administration. It was his belief that all communism was a Moscow-directed conspiracy bent upon world conquest. The time had come, he proclaimed, to pass over from containment to liberation. The United States tried to apply lessons learned in the struggles over Eastern Europe and Korea to Southeast Asia, where the French had lost to Communist-led insurgents in Vietnam. Efforts to hold a meeting between the American and Soviet heads of state in 1960 broke down amid Cold War accusations. In 1961, irritations over Germany were exacerbated by the construction of the Berlin Wall, sealing off democratic West Berlin from East Berlin and the rest of Communist East Germany. In 1962, the Cuban missile crisis, a Cold War confrontation over the placement of Russian missiles in Cuba, came close to erupting into a real war.

Nevertheless, the 1960s and most of the 1970s witnessed a general lessening of tensions in the Cold War. A nuclear test ban treaty between the two powers was signed in 1963, and strategic arms limitation talks were initiated in 1969. After 1969, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were often described by the word detente, emphasising cooperation rather than confrontation.

In the later 1970s and early 1980s events proved that the Cold War was not over. The increasing ties between Communist China and the United States were perceived as a threat by the Soviet Union. When Jimmy Carter became president in 1977, the Soviet leaders quickly took offense at his insistence on the granting of human rights throughout the world, including the Soviet Union, and they were uncomfortable with his open style of diplomacy. A Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 led to the American boycott of the Olympic Games in 1980 and an embargo on grain shipments to the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration took a much tougher stand toward the Soviet Union and Communism in general, reviving Cold War rhetoric and dramatically increasing arms production. In the 1980s the Polish crisis, American attempts to limit exportation of certain technology and materials by western nations to the Soviet Union, the deployment of new American missiles in Europe, the American Strategic Defense Initiative, and the rejection of the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty heightened tensions between the two powers. However, since 1985 the new arms limitations talks, the signing of an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a unilateral reduction of conventional forces in Eastern Europe, a more conciliatory foreign policy, Soviet commitment in internal political and economic reforms, and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan have contributed to improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

What is the Meaning? The Cold War was the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, each supported by its respective non-Communist and Communist allies, which coloured international relations during the four decades following World War II. On one side, the Soviet Union strove to secure itself from external threats and to spread its version of communism to the border states and elsewhere in the world. On the other side, the United States strove to contain Soviet influence and to counter Communist threats wherever they were perceived throughout the world. It was a war fought in almost all ways except open military conflict, and the threat of military force was always present. At times, the Cold War became violent, but the two superpowers never came together in direct armed combat.

In 1945, the leaders of the victorious nations were confronted with the tasks of making a lasting peace and restoring a shattered world. From the beginning these tasks were hampered by hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union. This hostility pervaded and poisoned every area of post-war international relations. To understand the nature and origins of the Cold War, one must go back to the conferences held by the Allies during the war and to the legacy of assumptions held by participants in those conferences.

Why did the Two Blocs Emerge? Although Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union were cooperating allies during most of World War II, they approached each other with differing perceptions and a history of distrust. Since the Communists came to power in Russia in 1917, leaders of the Soviet Union and the capitalist democracies had viewed each other as opponents. As ideologies, Communism and Capitalism had always been in direct opposition. As practiced in the Soviet Union under Lenin and especially Stalin, Communism took a totalitarian form, in sharp contrast to the democracies of Great Britain and the United States. Specific developments between the Russian Revolution of 1917 and World War II added to the hostility between the Soviet Union and the capitalist democracies. During the Russian civil war, the western nations had supported anti-Bolshevik forces with materials and some troops. The United States had not recognised the Bolshevik government until 1933. The Soviet Union had not even been invited to the Munich Conference of 1938. In viewing the rise of Fascist and authoritarian governments during the 1920s and 1930s, many in the western democracies found consolation in the opposition of these governments to communism. The western democracies failed to ally with the Soviet Union in the 1930s against the growing threat of Nazi Germany. In 1939, Stalin entered into an astonishing pact with Hitler, enabling Nazi forces to concentrate on Western Europe during the first years of World War II. Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union and the entry of the United States into the war united Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union as allies more in opposition to Nazi Germany than in agreement over principles or goals. When concrete negotiations for war aims and terms of a settlement took place, the history of hostility, distrust, and fear between capitalist and Communist powers caused problems. These problems would increase after the war when the threat of Nazi Germany no longer held the Allies together.

The decisions that led to the peace settlements, that helped shape Europe in the immediate post-war years, and laid the groundwork for the Cold War were made in a series of conferences held by the leaders of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The first conference took place in December 1943 at Teheran. There Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany; and Great Britain and the United States agreed to open a second front in France. The most crucial decision was to reject Churchill's plan to open a front in Eastern Europe, which would have given Great Britain and the United States more influence over developments there. With British and American forces concentrated in Western Europe, Eastern Europe was open to the advancing Russian troops. The next meeting of the three heads of state was in February 1945 at Yalta. The four main areas of discussion were, (1) the United Nations charter, (2) Germany, (3) Eastern Europe, and (4) Far East. All quickly reached agreement on questions concerning the United Nations charter. They also agreed on most matters concerning Germany: complete denazification with severe punishment for the top Nazis; demilitarisation; the division of the country into four occupation zones; and a long period of occupation by the Allies. There was no agreement on the stiff reparations demanded by Stalin. In the discussion over Eastern Europe, a sharp cleavage soon developed. Stalin argued that Eastern Europe, already behind Soviet lines, was vital to the Soviet Union's security. Russia had been invaded through these countries in both world wars and many of them had been Hitler's allies. Therefore, he asserted, the Soviet Union should maintain a measure of control over these countries. Roosevelt and Churchill insisted that these countries must be given complete independence. These disagreements were not resolved; they were papered over with a general agreement that elections would be held as soon as possible in the liberated states of Eastern Europe but these states were to be friendly to the Soviet Union. In regard to the Far East, Stalin agreed to enter the war within three months after Germany's surrender in return for islands and port facilities that Japan had earlier taken from Russia and for increased Soviet influence in Korea.

The last meeting of the heads of state of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union took place in July 1945 at Potsdam. At this conference, Clement Attlee had replaced Winston Churchill as British prime minister and Truman had replaced Roosevelt as the American president. Matters that had already been agreed on were affirmed in greater detail, but there was still no fundamental agreement over Eastern Europe. Despite a general accord to work out peace treaties with the various nations as soon as possible, treaties with Germany's allies were not signed until February 10, 1947, and a final treaty with Germany was never signed.

While the war ended in 1945 with a complete victory for the Allies, the basis for post-war problems was already present.' The legacy of distrust and hostility between Communist Russia and the Capitalist West was not eradicated by the temporary period of cooperation during the war years. Decisions and disagreements at the wartime conferences resulted in resentments and accusations on both sides, particularly over Eastern Europe. Faced with the reality of Eastern Europe's being behind Soviet lines, Great Britain and the United States were at a disadvantage. Europe, though struggling to recover, was already politically divided. Political divisions would merge into Cold War divisions in the years following 1945.

Cold War: US and Soviet Alliances

What was the Condition of Western Bloc? Europe faced peace in 1945 politically disorganised and economically crippled. Allied and Soviet occupation forces carved Germany into zones and its capital, Berlin, into sectors. In the international arena, growing antagonism marked the relation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two nations that controlled the future of Europe.

When the dust from the last bombs settled over Europe's cities, the balance sheets of destruction were tallied. Millions of survivors found themselves homeless, having lost their loved ones, often all their personal belongings, and the roofs over their heads. Millions returned home from battlefronts and concentration camps to rubble, with wounds beyond healing. There were no jobs; there was nothing to eat. Peacetime rationing dipped below wartime levels. What was not measured in the statistics on physical and human destruction, at least immediately, was the psychological devastation that succeeded such loss. There could be no returning to life as normal. For many, the war was far gentler than the peace. For these combatants of peacetime, often women and children, digging out and surviving were the greatest battles of all.

An American military observer reported to his superiors in 1947: 'Europe is steadily deteriorating. The political position reflects the economic. One political crisis after another merely denotes the existence of economic distress. Millions of people in the cities are slowly starving.' Even the winners were losers as survivors faced a level of human and material destruction unknown in the history of warfare. Economists judged that Europe would need at least 25 years to regain its pre-war economic capacity. The worst was also feared: Europe would never recover as a world economic power.

Large-scale population movements made matters worse. Displaced persons moved across Europe by the millions. The release of prisoners of war and slave workers imprisoned during the Third Reich strained already weak economies. Germans were expelled from territories that Germany had controlled before the war. Soviet expansionist policies forced others to flee Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Jews who survived the concentration camps resettled outside Europe, primarily in Palestine and the United States.

Industrial production in 1945 was one-third of its level in 1938. Housing shortages existed everywhere. France had lost one-fifth of its housing during the war years; Germany's 50 largest cities had seen two-fifths of their buildings reduced to rubble. Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, Dresden, Warsaw, and Berlin were virtually destroyed. The transportation infrastructure was severely damaged: railways, roads, and bridges were in shambles all over Europe. Communications networks were in disarray. In some cases, industrial plants had not been as adversely affected as urban centres. Yet machinery everywhere had been worn out in wartime production and replacement parts were non-existent. German equipment was dismantled and seized by Soviet soldiers to be used in Russia in place of what the Germans had destroyed.

Agriculture, too, suffered severe reversals in wartime economies and was unable to resume pre-war production in 1945. In general, European agriculture was producing at 50 per cent of its pre-war capacity. Livestock had been decimated during the war years – in France, for example, 50 per cent of all farm animals had been killed – and it was estimated that restoring herds would take decades. Italy suffered greatly, with one-third of its overall assets destroyed. The scarcity of goods converged with ballooning inflation. Black markets with astronomical prices for necessities flourished, while currency rates plummeted. Everywhere the outlook was bleak. Yet in less than a decade, the situation had been reversed. The solution came from outside of Europe.

What was the Marshall Plan? In contrast to the Soviet Union, the United States had incurred relatively light casualties in World War II. Since the fighting had not taken place on the North American continent, US cities, farmlands, and factories were intact. As the chief producer and supplier for the Allied war effort, even before its entry into the conflict, the United States had benefitted from the conflict in Europe and expanded its economic productivity during the war. In 1945, the United States was producing a full 50 per cent of the world's gross national product — a staggering fact to a displaced Great Britain, whose former trade networks were permanently destroyed. Furthermore, the United States held two-thirds of the world's gold. A United States bursting with energy and prosperity was a real threat to the Soviet Union viewing the rubble of its destroyed cities and counting the bodies of its dead.

The United States knew that it lacked one important guarantee to secure its growth and its future prosperity: adequate international markets for its goods. After World War I, American officials and businessmen understood that America's productive capacity was outpacing its ability to export goods. In the 1920s, the United States had exported capital to Europe in the form of private loans with the hope that trade would flourish as a result. The decade following the Great Depression of 1929 witnessed the search for a policy to expand

U.S. markets. Both Europe and Japan were recognised as potential buyers for American goods, but both areas parried with protectionism to foster their own post-depression recovery.

World War II facilitated the success of an international economic policy consistent with international economic goals identified by US policymakers as early as 1920. In both Europe and Japan, the United States intervened to aid reconstruction and recovery of war-torn nations. These economies, hungry for capital, no longer opposed US intervention or erected trade barriers against American goods. The prospect of Europe in chaos economically, socially, and politically and on the verge of collapse justified immediate action by the United States.

By the spring of 1947, it was clear to American policymakers that initial post-war attempts to stabilise European economies and promote world recovery were simply not working. The United States had, earlier in the same year, engineered emergency aid to Turkey and Greece, both objects of Soviet aspirations for control. President Truman articulated a doctrine bearing his name. The aid emerged in an atmosphere of opposition between the United States and the Soviet Union over issues of territorial control in Eastern and Southern Europe. The Cold War coincided with and reinforced the US need to reconstruct Western Europe.

On 5 June 1947, Secretary of State, George C. Marshall (1880–1959) delivered the commencement address at Harvard University. In his speech, Marshall introduced the European Recovery Act, popularly known as the Marshall Plan, through which billions of dollars in aid would be made available to European states, both in the East and in the West, provided that two conditions were met: (1) the recipient states must cooperate with one another in aligning national economic policies and improving the international monetary system, and (2) they must work toward breaking down trade barriers.

Participating countries included Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. Russia and Eastern European countries were also eligible for aid under the original formulation. Russia opposed the plan from the first, wary of US intentions to extend the influence of Western Capitalism. Soviet opposition encouraged members of the US Congress, afraid of a Communist takeover in Europe, to support the plan.

Like the United States, the Soviet Union had its own economic imperatives that dictated its attitudes toward European economic development. Under Stalin's direction, the Soviet Union concentrated all its efforts on reconstructing its devastated economy and, to this end, sought integration with Eastern European states, whose technology and resources were needed for rebuilding of the Soviet state. US dominance threatened the vital connection with Eastern Europe that the Soviet Union was determinedly solidifying in the post-war years.

The amount of US aid to Europe was massive. Over $23 billion was pumped into Western Europe between 1947 and 1952. By every measure, the Marshall Plan was judged a success in the West. American foreign aid restored Western European trade and production, while at the same time controlling inflation. Dean Acheson (1893–1971), Marshall's successor as secretary of state, described the plan in terms of 'our duty as human beings' but nevertheless considered it 'chiefly as a matter of national self-interest''. Soviet critics and western observers differed dramatically in describing the relationship between self-interest and philanthropy as motives for the plan.

How was the Plan Administered? As significant as the gift of funds to European states undoubtedly was, no less important was the whole administrative apparatus that the American money brought in its wake. In order to expend available monies most effectively and comply with stipulations for cooperation and regulation, the states of Western Europe resorted to intensified planning and limited nationalisation. These ideas were not new in the experience of European states: Vichy France, for example, had emphasised the importance of planning and specialisation in its corporatist approach to economic development and social-welfare policies. Regulation and state intervention dominated the formulation of economic policy. Special attention was given to workers' welfare through unemployment insurance, retirement benefits, public health, and housing policies. European states recognized the need to provide a safety net for their citizens in order to avoid re-experiencing the disastrous depression and stagnation of the 1930s while attempting to rebuild their shattered economies. These were lessons that had been learned as much from the attempts at recovery before 1939 as from the experiences of running wartime economies.

The economic theory of John Maynard Keynes, applied successfully by neutral Sweden to its economic policies during the war, came into vogue throughout Europe in 1945, and the post-war era saw the triumph of Keynesian economics. Keynes favoured macro-economic policies to increase productivity and argued for an active role for government in 'priming the pump' of economic growth. The government should be responsible, according to Keynes, for the control and regulation of the economy with the goal of ensuring full employment for its people. Governments could and should check inflation and eliminate boom-and-bust cycles, incurring deficits by spending beyond revenues if necessary.

US foreign aid contributed mightily to the extension of central planning and the growth of the welfare state throughout Western Europe. Money alone could not have accomplished the recovery that took place. The chief mechanism for administering Marshall Plan aid was the Office of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). This master coordinating agency made the requirements for recovery clear. European states had to stabilise their own economies. Cooperation between the public and private sectors was intended to free market forces, modernise production, and raise productivity. Planning mechanisms, including transnational organisations and networks, resulted in the modernisation of production and the assimilation of new techniques, new styles of management, and innovative business practices from the United States. This modernisation of economies through centrally coordinated planning made Europe once again a major contender in the international economic arena.

The exception to the establishment of central planning agencies and nationalisation of key industries was West Germany. Deciding against the British and French models of planned growth, the West Germans endorsed a free-market policy that encouraged private enterprise while providing state insurance for all workers. What has been described as 'a free enterprise economy with a social conscience' produced the richest economy in Western Europe by the mid-1950s. Some West German industries had been dismantled, but much of West Germany's productive capacity remained intact in the late 1940s. The wealth of great industrialists, such as Krupp serving prison sentences as war criminals, had not been expropriated, and their commercial empires stood ready to direct the economic revival. The Krupp and I.G. Farben empires were successfully broken into smaller units. Industries forced to start afresh benefitted from the latest technology.

The United States had succeeded in exporting aspects of its own economy abroad. Through management and planning, recipients of American aid surpassed US goals. A multilateral system of world trade emerged out of the ashes of war. The effects of the Great Depression, which the world had been unable to shake throughout the 1930s, had been laid to rest by global war and its consequences.

What was the Condition of Eastern Bloc? The Soviet Union implemented an expansion of its territorial boundaries as a way of reversing some of its drastic losses in the war. Above all, it wanted a protective ring of satellite states as security from attack from the west. Stalin also was eager to see the Soviet Union surrounded by 'friendly' governments in Eastern Europe to replace the hostile regimes with which the Soviets had to contend in the period between the wars. Picking up territory from Finland, Poland, and parts of East Prussia and Eastern Czechoslovakia; forcibly reincorporating the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and recovering Bessarabia, the Soviet Union succeeded in acquiring sizable territories. In addition, the Soviet state dedicated itself to economic reconstruction behind a protective buffer of satellite states – Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria – over which Soviet leaders exercised strong control. Yugoslavia and Albania chose to follow an independent Communist path. Lacking the capital necessary to finance recovery, the Soviets sought compensation from Eastern and Central European territories.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe participated in the general European recovery from World War II, but their recovery was slower, not nearly as spectacular as in Western Europe. The Soviet Union initially set the pattern of economic and political development, but over time the various nations within the Soviet sphere of dominance moved in their own directions. In the decades following the 1960s, economic problems appeared and persisted. Agricultural production became an almost yearly disappointment. High administrative costs, inflexibility to market demand, and lethargy in productivity plagued industry. The gap between the economies of Western and Eastern Europe seemed to be widening rather than narrowing. In recent years, these economic problems and the Soviet Union's own efforts at political and economic reform have led to considerable unrest and demands for economic decentralisation in Eastern Europe. Ultimately, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe embarked on a series of major long-term reforms.

How did Soviet Union Tackle the Problems? Though the Soviet Union emerged victorious from World War II, the social and economic costs had been high. Few changes from pre-war policies were evident. Stalin continued to assert totalitarian rule with a tightly planned economy stressing heavy industrialisation. Political dissent was not allowed, and purges removed those perceived as potential threats. Prisons and forced-labour camps remained a feature of Stalin's rule. Despite the heavy expenditures required to maintain the Red Army, the Soviet Union recovered.

The death of Stalin in 1953 led to a liberalisation of policies within the Soviet Union. Initially, Malenkov and Khrushchev struggled for power, but by 1955 Khrushchev had emerged as Stalin's successor. The most dramatic indication of changes from the Stalin era came in a 1956 speech in which Khrushchev denounced the crimes of Stalin before startled Communist leaders in Moscow. Khrushchev removed many of the conservative Stalinists within the party hierarchy but avoided the use of harsh Stalinist purges. Controls over cultural life were slightly loosened, as evidenced by the publication of novels by Boris Pasternak. Economically, there was new stress on consumer goods and an attempt was made to reform agricultural policy. He embarked on an ambitious foreign policy. Khrushchev may have tried to do too much at once, for domestic and international difficulties began to undermine his position. The gravest problems occurred in foreign affairs. The Soviet Union became involved in a growing ideological dispute with the Chinese Communists, who were younger and more evangelical in the Marxist faith than the Russians. The split between the Soviet Union and China was intensified by boundary disputes. In 1962, Khrushchev blundered into a showdown with the United States by trying to set up Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba and was forced to make a humiliating retreat.

In October 1964, Khrushchev was suddenly ousted from power by his colleagues in the party's Central Committee. Leonid Brezhnev replaced him as party secretary, eventually emerging as the actual head of government by the late 1960s. Brezhnev reversed some of the liberalisation of the Khrushchev years but did not fully return to Stalinist policies or practices. The Brezhnev era was marked by relative stability within the Soviet Union, a stability that seemed to persist under Andropov, his successor. The Soviet economy has continued to expand but unevenly and not as rapidly as expected – thanks to the drain of military and administrative expenditures. By the 1980s, the Soviet Union was a world leader in the production of steel, oil, coal, and cotton, and its industry was being computerised. Soviet agriculture was less successful. Although mechanisation constantly increased, periodic droughts, poor management, and lack of incentive forced the government to make repeated and expensive grain purchases from the United States and Canada. The standard of living rose, but it still trailed that of the West and even that of some of the satellite countries in Eastern Europe. Soviet citizens enjoyed free education and medical services and relative job security. The Soviet Union continued to assert itself internationally as a world power, as indicated by its involvement and intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Africa in the 1970s, Afghanistan in 1979, and Poland during the 1980s.

After Brezhnev died in 1982, Yuri Andropov (1982–84) and then Konstantin Chernenko (1984–85) came to power, but they did little to change the policies of the Brezhnev era. However, in 1985 the relatively young 54-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power and initiated a series of important reforms (glasnost—openness; perestroika—restructuring) in both foreign and domestic policy, including remodelling of the political system, attacks on corruption within the bureaucracy, decentralisation of economic policy, relaxation of controls over political and cultural dissent, and new efforts to relax international tensions and stimulate disarmament agreements. These reforms produced both resistance and change within the Soviet Union.

What were the Developments in Eastern Europe? The governments and economies of Eastern Europe were brought under Stalin's control and set up in imitation of the Soviet model during the late 1940s. Initially, the Soviet Union drained off economic resources from these countries to strengthen its own economy. Soon singleparty 'people's democracies' were established in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Each of these governments was dominated by the head of its Communist party, who usually ruled in Stalinist pattern. Each developed a planned economy stressing industrialisation and collectivisation of agriculture, and generally a high rate of economic growth was achieved. Each was required to cooperate politically, economically, and militarily with the Soviet Union. All major policies were tightly coordinated to the wishes of Moscow. Contact with the West was strictly limited. The one exception was Yugoslavia, wherein 1948 Tito managed to break from the rest of the Communist bloc and take an independent course. Tito initiated a more decentralised form of Communism stressing increased local control and worker participation in management.

Nevertheless, Eastern Europe should not be thought of as a mere appendage to the Soviet Union, even during the Stalinist period. Each state had its own sense of Nationalism, each had its own particular ethnic mix, and each had its own history. The Soviet Union had not found it easy to gain or maintain control.

The first stirrings of revolt from Soviet control followed Stalin's death. In 1953 East Berliners rose but were quickly crushed by force. Following Khrushchev's 1956 speech denouncing Stalin and some of his policies, Poland rose in revolt. A compromise that left Poland within the Soviet sphere of control avoided the use of Soviet troops in Poland. Poland would enjoy a mild liberalisation of its intellectual life and some economic independence. Shortly thereafter, a more violent armed revolt took place in Hungary. This more challenging demand for independence was met by an invasion of troops and the ouster of the new government. Nevertheless, under the Moscow-approved but moderate Janos Kadar, Hungarians were allowed increased individual freedom and greater national self-determination.

These revolts revealed some of the discontent and hopes for greater independence within East European nations, but the Soviet response also indicated the allowable limits to any deviance from the Soviet line. National differences between the various East European states and the Soviet Union were recognised. Contact with the West would be allowed. Cultural activities might be less restricted than in the Soviet Union. Fundamental political, economic, and military cooperation with Moscow was not to be violated.

Since the late 1950s, various Eastern European nations have pursued separate courses within the limits set by the Soviet Union. East Germany, Hungary, and Romania remained relatively tranquil during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. East Germany has closely followed the Soviet line while developing its industrial capacity. Hungary has successfully managed to orient its economy toward consumer goods, due to a loosening of state control and the introduction of limited capitalistic practices at the local level. In 1989, Hungary took new steps toward substantial democratic reform. Romania has taken a more politically independent and conservative course under the leadership of president Nicolae Ceausescu.

Albania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have proven to be more of a problem to Moscow. In 1961 Albania, under Enver Hoxha, broke from Moscow and took the side of the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet split. Since Albania was surrounded by the already independent Yugoslavia and Greece, there was little the Soviet Union could do. In 1968, the Dubcek government in Czechoslovakia went too far in allowing intellectual freedom and some democratisation. The Soviet Union mobilised the troops of the Warsaw Pact nations and occupied Czechoslovakia. Dubcek and his supporters were removed from power along with their liberalising policies. In 1980, the Polish government began to have difficulty maintaining its control over the nation. Mainly protesting the continuing economic mismanagement and corruption within the government, Polish workers struck and organised a union, Solidarity, under the leadership of Lech Walesa. Solidarity became increasingly powerful and was succeeding in forcing the government to grant concessions. When the union seemed to go too far, pressure from Moscow and resistance from conservative elements in the Polish government stiffened. In December 1981, martial law was declared by the new leader of the Polish Communist party, General Wojciech Jaruzelski. After a series of governmental crackdowns, Solidarity was outlawed in October 1982. In 1983, martial law was lifted and the government, pressured in part by the Catholic Church, made some minor conciliatory gestures. Yet the fundamental political and economic problems that led to the unrest still keep Poland in a state of tension, as revealed by new strikes, a renewal of Solidarity's activities in 1988, new agreements between Solidarity and the government, and elections in 1989 giving Solidarity even greater power.

When compared with the economies of nations in Western Europe, the economies of Eastern Europe seem deficient. This deficiency is particularly apparent in recent years as the gap between Western and Eastern Europe seems to have widened. In the late 1980s, Eastern Europe has been marked by growing discontent, greater political instability, and new demands for decentralisation of economic decision making (as in Western capitalistic countries). On the other hand the economies of Eastern Europe started from a lower base and had to overcome greater difficulties. Overall, these economies have been modernising, and Eastern Europeans have been enjoying a rising standard of living. Basic social services are extensive. With the exception of the elite of the Communist party and certain professionals, the gap between rich and poor classes has been narrowed. The Eastern European nations, while still under the shadow of the Soviet Union, are distinct states with their own pasts and futures.

Emergence of Third World

What is the Meaning? The term 'Third World' refers to the economically backward countries of Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America, regarded as a group with common features, such as poverty, high birth-rates, and economic dependence on the developed countries. The French demographer Alfred Sauvy invented the phrase (tiers monde in French) in 1952 in likeness to the 'third estate.' It refers to the commoners of France before and during the French Revolution, in contrast to priests and nobles, consisting of the first and second estates respectively. Just like the third estate, arued Sauvy, the Third World is nothing, and it 'wants to be something.' The term, therefore, means that the Third World is exploited in ways similar to the exploitation of the third estate, and that, like the third estate its destiny is a revolutionary one. It also implies a second idea, also pointed out by Sauvy, that of non-alignment, for the Third World does not belong either to the industrialised capitalist world or to the industrialised Communist group.

The term, Third World, was applied at the 1955 Conference of Afro-Asian countries held in Bandung, Indonesia. In 1956, some social scientists connected to Sauvy's National Institute of Demographic Studies, in Paris, published a book called Le Tiers-Monde. After three years, the French economist Francois Perroux started a new journal with the same title to deal with problems of underdevelopment. Towards close of the 1950s, the phrase was commonly used in the French media to refer to the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America.

The First World refers to the developed world – US, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, etc. The Second World meant the Communist world led by the USSR. With the fall of the USSR and the Communist bloc, Second World no longer exists. The Third World means the underdeveloped world – agrarian, rural and poor. Third World countries usually have one or two flourishing cities, but the remaining part of the country is poor, rural and agrarian. Presently Eastern Europe would be treated as part of Third World. Russia should similarly be treated a Third World country albeit with nuclear weapons. China, has always been regarded Third World, and continues to be so. Normally, Latin America, Africa, and most of Asia are still treated as Third World. The Asian tigers of South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia and, Thailand (despite their big cities, their production facilities, a small middle class and a much smaller ruling elite) should also be counted as Third World countries, because their populations are overwhelmingly rural, agrarian and poor.

Some poor African countries have no industrialisation, are predominantly agrarian (subsistence farming), and have no chance of industrialising and competing in the world 'marketplace'. These are occasionally termed the 'Fourth World'. The expression 'Third World' is not unanimously accepted. Some favour other terms like the South, non-industrialised countries, underdeveloped countries, undeveloped countries, mal-developed countries, emerging nations. The phrase 'Third World' is undoubtedly the most commonly used in the media today. There is no other term to describe all non-'First World', non-industri-alised, non-developed, non-Western countries more accurately.

What are its Problems? The underdevelopment of the Third World is manifested by a number of common features: distorted economies dedicated to producing primary products for the developed world and to offer markets for their finished goods; conventional, rural social structures; high population growth; and pervasive poverty. Nonetheless, Third World is hugely disparate, because it comprised countries at various levels of economic development. In spite of the poverty of the rural areas and the urban slums, the ruling elites of most Third World countries are affluent.

This mixture of situations across Asia, Africa, Oceania and Latin America is connected to the incorporation of the Third World into the global capitalist economy, by way of conquest or indirect domination. The chief economic result of western domination was the first ever creation of a world market. By establishing all over the Third World sub-economies connected to the West, and by inaugurating other modern institutions, Industrial Capitalism disrupted not only traditional economies but also societies. This disruption led to underdevelopment.

Since the economies of underdeveloped countries have been oriented towards the needs of industrialised countries, they mostly include limited modern economic activities, such as mining or cultivation of plantation crops. Management of these activities has continued to be in the hands of large foreign firms. The prices of Third World products are generally fixed by large buyers in the Western countries, and trade with the West accounts for almost all the Third World's income. Throughout the colonial period, blatant exploitation severely restricted the accumulation of capital within the foreigndominated countries. Even after decolonisation in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the Third World economies grew slowly, or not at all, mainly due to the deterioration of the 'terms of trade'. This term refers to the relation between the cost of goods that a nation import and its income from the exports to foreign countries. Because buyers in the industrialised countries fixed the prices of almost all goods involved in international trade, the deteriorating condition of the Third World was hardly surprising. Only the oil-producing countries (after 1973) managed to avoid the effects of Western domination of the world economy.

No research on the Third World could hope to measure its future prospects without considering population growth. In 1980, the earth's population stood at 4.4 billion, with the Third World accounting for 72 per cent of it. And by the end of the century it was expected to reach 6.2 billion, with 80 per cent in the Third World. This projected population explosion in the Third World is likely to prevent any major improvements in living standards there as well as pose threat of worsening poverty in stagnant economies.

What are its Prospects? The Bandung Conference in 1955 was the commencement of the political appearance of the Third World. Two nations with diametrically opposite social and economic systems– China and India – played a major role in promoting that conference and in altering the relation between the Third World and the industrial countries, Capitalist as well as Communist. Due to decolonisation, the United Nations that was initially numerically dominated by European countries and countries of European origin, was steadily changed into almost a Third World forum. Consequently, the issue of underdevelopment soon became the focus of an unending, but essentially academic, debate. Despite that debate, the unity of the Third World continues to be theoretical, expressed mainly from the platforms of international conferences.

Foreign aid as well as every effort of existing institutions and structures have not been successful in solving the problem of underdevelopment. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in New Delhi in 1971 proposed that one per cent of the national income of industrialised countries should be allotted to aiding the Third World. That figure has never been realised, or even approximated. In 1972 the Santiago (Chile) UNCTAD fixed a target of a six per cent economic growth rate in the 1970s for the underdeveloped countries. This, too, was never accomplished. The unenviable living conditions of the overwhelming majority of the three billion people belonging to the poor countries have neither changed since 1972 nor deteriorated much.

The economic development that has taken place in the Third World has not been distributed justly either between nations or among classes within nations. Majority of the Third World countries that have succeeded in achieving considerable economic growth are those that produce oil: mostly Arab countries, Iran, Gabon, and Venezuela. They became prosperous because after 1973 the Organization of Oil producing Countries (OPEC), a cartel, decided to increase the price of oil drastically. Other important raw materials are also produced by underdeveloped countries, which have similarly established cartels like OPEC. For example, Australia, Guinea, Guyana, Jamaica, Sierra Leone, Suriname, and Yugoslavia established the Bauxite International Association (BIA) in 1974; and Chile, Peru, Zaire, and Zambia set up a cartel of copper producing countries in 1967. Even strategic raw materials like copper and bauxite are not as crucial to the industrialised countries as oil, and these cartels thus lack OPEC's power. Further, the countries that produce food items like cocoa, coffee and other foods are practically helpless to impose their will. In fact, among the non-OPEC countries, only Brazil, the Ivory Coast, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have enjoyed noteworthy economic growth. Since the underdeveloped nations are jointly so weak, the so-called 'new economic order' advocated by some of them may only remain a phrase.

Nevertheless, the relationship between the underdeveloped and the industrialised countries has become better. In 1975, the European Economic Community (EEC) signed an agreement, called the Lome Pact, with 46 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) nations that exempted most ACP exports from tariffs. The Lome II Pact, concluded in 1979 by the EEC and 57 ACP countries, elaborated the Lome I treaty, for instance, by guaranteeing income from agricultural exports.

Yet, other than a few oil-producing countries with low populations, the economic crisis of the 1970s was more harmful to the Third World than to the West. Moreover, in the near future apparently there is not much scope for any major change in the relationship between the industrialised and underdeveloped countries. Unfortunately, the prospects for economic development in the Third World seem to be very bleak: between 1960 and 1980 half of the African countries had actually become poorer. The only countries to get some of the capital needed for development were those fortunate enough to have a significant amount of raw materials, especially oil, to export.

Every international agency feels that drastic action is needed to improve conditions in Third World countries. These consist of urban and rural public work projects to tackle joblessness and underemployment, institutional reforms crucial for the redistribution of economic power, agrarian reform, tax reform, and the reform of public funding. In truth, political and social hurdles to reform are integral to the international order and most Third World regimes.

Uno And Global Disputes

Why and how was UNO Born? The birth of the United Nations represents the culmination of a prolonged quest for international peace and cooperation. The Concert of Europe during the 19th century was a step in that direction. The League of Nations, as part of the peace settlement of 1919, was the first permanent and universal organisation of its kind. However, it fell victim to the forces of aggressive Nationalism and Militarism.

It was on the ruins of the League system that a new and better equipped organisation was to emerge. This is traceable to the Atlantic Charter (August 14, 1941), jointly signed by Churchill and Roosevelt. The charter stated that every nation of the world, for realistic and ideological reasons, must abandon the use of force. Moreover, 'since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten or may threaten aggression outside their frontiers,' they, the signatories, believe, 'pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential'. The Atlantic Charter anticipated a stable international organisation and a more effective system of collective security than that stipulated by the League of Nations.

Next, the Moscow Conference of the Allies led to the promulgation of a Declaration (October 30, 1943). The Teheran Declaration (December 1, 1943) entrusted to the Allies the task initiating 'a world family of democratic nations'. The Dumberton Oaks Conference (1944) prepared proposals for the establishment of a general international organisation. Finally, the San Francisco Conference, sponsored by Britain, the USA and the USSR, met on Apri1 25, 1945. While the Allies were virtually committed to the defence of 'a common set of proposals and anxious to avoid reopening of old wounds', the smaller countries did not like the excessive domination of UN by the great powers. In particular, they took exception to the principle of veto. Ultimately compromised conclusions were agreed upon. The Dumberton Oaks structure remained virtually intact, though some important changes were introduced. Finally, the Charter came into effect on October 24, 1945.

The states participating at the San Francisco Conference and eventually becoming original members of the UN numbered 51. Article 4 of the UN Charter states that membership is to be conferred upon peace-loving and law-abiding nations. The General Assembly can, on the recommendations of the Security Council, admit a state to membership. The principal organs of the UN, as stipulated under Article 7, are the General Assembly, Security Council and others.

How did the General Assembly Function? It elects its president annually and meets at least once a year on the initiative of either the UN Secretary-General or the majority of the member states. The proceedings of the General Assembly can be divided into four categories: (a) formulation of international public opinion, (b) pacific settlement of international disputes, (c) discussion and clarification of international law and basic human rights, and (d) transfer of issues from the Security Council to the General Assembly.

It consists of all members of the United Nations, each state having not more than five representatives and a single vote. In this body, there is no difference at all between a big power and a small power; all members have the right to equal representation, equal opportunity to participate in discussions, and equal voting power. Decision on substantive matters are taken by simple majority of two-third votes, depending upon the importance of the question. There is no veto, which is a special privilege of the permanent members of the Security Council in that council only.

The Assembly is an advisory and recommendatory body; its resolutions have no binding effect. Its jurisdiction covers a very wide range of matters – 'any question or any matter within the scope of the present charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organ provided for in the present charter'. More specifically, the Assembly can consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security as well as specific questions relating to the maintenance of peace and security. It can deal with a wide range of matters in the field of economic, social and cultural cooperation. It can also look into the administration of territories which are not self-governed, with human rights and self-determination. It has authority in respect of the composition of the United Nations bodies. It can admit new members to the United Nations on the recommendation of the Security Council. It can elect non-permanent members of the Security Council. It can join the Security Council in electing judges to the International Court of Justice. There is one serious restriction on the functions of the General Assembly: It cannot deal with any matter which is already placed before the Security Council unless requested by the body.

The role which the General Assembly has actually been playing in international affairs cannot be assessed properly on the basis of the functions assigned to it in the charter. Since 1948, the General Assembly has largely replaced the Security Council as the chief UN organ to deal with political questions. The total number of political and security questions dealt with by the General Assembly between the years 1946 and 1961 was 206, as against 57 dealt with by the Security Council.

The process of expansion of the General Assembly's jurisdiction was accelerated by the 'uniting for peace' resolution adopted by the Assembly in 1950 in connection with the Korean War. 'If the Security Council' said the resolution, 'was prevented from acting in an emergency, the Assembly could meet on short notice and recommend appropriate collective measures for maintenance or restoration of peace, including the use of armed force, if necessary.' Strictly speaking, this was an encroachment upon the functions of the Security Council, and it is doubtful whether the resolution is legally consistent with the provisions of the charter. It was the political response of the Assembly, which was then dominated by the United States, to the situation created by the Soviet Union's use of the veto. As the Security Council was immobilised, the General Assembly took upon itself the responsibility of taking action in the interest of international peace.

The United States favoured enlargement of the Assembly's functions for two reasons. It could count upon a substantial majority in the Assembly, and the Soviet Union would normally be in a minority. Secondly, the Soviet Union could not reduce the Assembly to immobility because it had no veto there. For these reasons, the Soviet Union opposed the 'uniting for peace' resolution.

In recent years, the United States has lost its advantageous position in the Assembly as a result of large increase in the number of Afro-Asian members who generally support the Soviet Union particularly on issues connected with Imperialism and Colonialism. The Assembly is now a much larger body than it was in earlier. Technically speaking, the decisions of the UN have no binding force, but they are morally and politically important.

What is the Role of Security Council? The Articles 23 and 32 relate to the Security Council. The charter provided that the Security Council would consist of eleven members of the United Nations – five permanent members (China, France, the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States) and six non-permanent members, elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, without eligibility for immediate re-election. By an amendment of the charter, which became effective on and from August 31, 1965, the number of non-permanent members was raised to.

There was no Communist China when the UN was born. Subsequently in 1949, the entire mainland of China came under the Communist government, and the previous Kuomintang government shifted to the island of Formosa (Taiwan). The permanent seat in the Security Council assigned to China was occupied by the Kuomintang government, and the Communist government had no place in the United Nations. The anomalous arrangement has now been changed, and the permanent seat assigned to China has been occupied by the Peking government.

Each member of the Security Council has one vote, but these votes do not have equal weight as in the General Assembly. In 'procedural matters', decisions are made, according to the provisions of the charter, by seven 'affirmative' votes. (This number has been raised to nine by the amendment.) Decisions on non-procedural or substantive matters are made, according to the provisions of the charter, by seven 'affirmative' votes 'including the concurring vote of the permanent members' (here also the number would be nine in terms of the amendment). In other words, no decision can be made on a substantive matter unless all permanent members agree, since anyone of the permanent members can veto a decision favoured by a majority, or even by all other members.

The big powers who established the United Nations provide for themselves two special privileges intended to safeguard their position and interests: (1) a permanent seat in the Security Council and (2) the power of veto.

The Security Council is the principal executive organ of the United Nations. Its primary responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security. In discharging the responsibility it may call upon disputing parties to seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. Against a recalcitrant party to a dispute it may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply 'sanctions' or coercive measures such as 'complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations'. In extreme cases the Security Council itself may 'take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary' using the' armed forces, assistance and facilities' provided by UN members as per the terms of the charter. The powers vested in the Security Council are larger than those enjoyed by the Council of the League of Nations. Article 39 stipulates that the Security Council must enquire into the alleged breach of peace before punitive measures are undertaken.

The role which the Security Council has been playing in international affairs cannot be assessed properly on the basis of the functions assigned to it in the charter. It has in practice failed to play the expected role of the central executive organ of the United Nations. The 'eclipse of the Security Council' is attributed primarily to the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. 'That conflict,' says Morgenthau, 'has paralysed the Security Council as an agency of international government.' In the few instances when it has been able to do so, as in the beginning of the Korean War, by accidental and temporary absence of the USSR. It is true that Soviet Union has used the veto too frequently. Of the 99 vetoes cast till 1961, Moscow was responsible for 92. But more than fifty per cent of the Soviet vetoes were cast on membership applications.

How does the UN Compare with the League? In general, the authors of the UN profited from the limitations and mistakes of the League of Nations. The experience of the League was utilised at different stages. This explains the continuity between the League and the UN. After all, like the League, the UN is a voluntary association of states for fostering international cooperation on political and non-political lines. The UN is equipped with virtually the same organisational network, including an assembly, council, court, secretariat, economic and social bodies and trusteeship committee. The delegations of member states are equal in size with one vote apiece. The UN, like its precursor, in most cases is empowered only to recommended and not command.

Yet there are some important differences between the provisions of the covenant and the charter in admission of new members, voting, withdrawal of members, suspension of members' privileges, preservation of collective security, treatment of economic and social issues, etc. Particularly important is the great authority enjoyed by the UN with regard to the maintenance of collective security. Articles 10, 11 and 16 of the League covenant dealing with war and peace were somewhat incomplete and defective. Article 1 of the UN charter recommends 'effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace'. The charter then proceeds to indicate the nature of 'effective collective measures' in Chapter 8. The sanctional articles of the charter are much stronger than those of the covenant.

The objectives of the charter are far more extensive than those of the covenant. By 1945, the idea of international cooperation had progressed substantially. The League Covenant was drafted as an organic constituent of the post-war peace settlement. This had many nations suspect the functions of the League. The drafting of the UN charter had nothing to do with any peace treaty. The League was basically an organisation of European powers, with the USA never a member and with different powers remaining outside the League at different stages. The UN may be called a truly global organisation, with non-European countries far outnumbering the countries of Europe and playing a vital role. Despite inadequacies, UN represents an advancement in respect of international peace and cooperation.

What are its Failures? It is generally agreed that the record of the United Nations fall short of the hopes and expectations of those who drafted the charter in 1945. While there is no satisfactory method of statistically measuring the extent of this shortcoming, most observers would agree that the gap is considerable.

Strictly speaking, the United Nations has not succeeded in settling in a definite way a single dispute dealt by the Security Council or by the General Assembly or by both. Final settlement of international disputes is rare; to prevent a crisis by postponement or compromise is often the best practical method of dealing with a threat to peace. Moreover, the charter does not require the United Nations to take direct responsibility for the solution of all disputes brought before it. The Security Council may leave any matter to be decided by the parties concerned, insisting only upon peaceful methods such as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful methods of their own choice. It should also be noted that mediators appointed by the United Nations have done useful work in connection with some international disputes, for example, the Indonesian and the Arab–Jewish issues.

One basic difference between the League system and the UN system lay in the degree of efficiency of 'sanctions'. The enforcement provisions in the charter were stronger than those in the covenant. As scholars point out, 'The planned-for 'teeth' have failed to grow.' Elaborate plans for security and enforcement have been prepared by the military staff committee, the Commission for Conventional Armaments, the Atomic Energy Committee, etc., but the rivalry of the Powers has stood in the way of their implementation. The result has been that members of the United Nations have turned to the right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 of the charter for providing greater assurance of their national security.

The charter emphasises the importance of agreement upon 'the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources'. The United Nations has not been able to achieve the regulation of national armament: Here again the root cause is the rivalry of the Powers. Less use has been made of the International Court of Justice for the settlement of legal disputes than what was made of the Permanent Court of International Justice during a comparable period.

What are its Achievements? While the list of failures is formidable, the list of achievements is far less impressive. The achievements of the United Nations lie primarily outside the sphere of international peace and security.

First, it has been very active in the field of human rights. One of its major achievements has been the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On 10 December 1948, the General Assembly proclaimed a declaration as 'a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations'. The declaration consists of a Preamble and 30 articles. Articles 1 and 2 talk of free birth of all human beings and equality of all in dignity and rights. Everyone is entitled to all rights and freedom put down in the declaration. The declaration further states non-distinction between race, colour, sex, language, and religion. Nor will national or social origin, birth or property be counted for or against any individual.

In 1982, feeling an increasing danger of military intervention in Central America by the American armed forces, Nicaragua asked for a meeting of the Security Council. The US government, in its turn, accused the Nicaraguan government of interfering in the affairs of the neighbouring states and of a conduct designed to destabilise the region.

The Central American nations got together to sign a comprehensive draft agreement called the 'Contadora Act on Peace and Cooperation in Central America'. The Security Council met in May on 1983 and agreed unanimously on the right of all Central American nations to live in El Salvador and Honduras and the increasing number of refugees in that region. It requested the United States to respect the Contadora Act. In 1987, the Secretary-General of the United

Nations and his counterpart of the Organisation of American States visited the Central American countries to organise peace and to accelerate the negotiating process. Under the five-nation peace plan (August 1987), it was decided not to grant sanctuary to rebel groups for attack on neighbours. The rebels continued to trouble the government in Nicaragua with the support from the USA. Under an accord reached in August 1989 it was agreed to disband the rebels and hold fair elections in 1990.

When Congo, now Zaire, got its independence from Belgium in 1960, the nation was in a bad shape. Civil war was imminent at the attempted secession of the province of Katanga. The Congolese government asked for military assistance and within 48 hours, the United Nations force provided by the Asian and African members reached Congo. In the next four years that it stayed there, its chief task was to help the nation restore peace and maintain its political independence. It also helped Congo in maintaining law and order, and took up a long-term programme of training and technical assistance. In February 1963, after having reinstated Katanga, the UN forces began to move out. Even after its departure, civilian aid continued in Congo till 1967 when Katanga was officially brought back into Congo.

The Security Council met in 1979 at the request of Democratic Kampuchea who accused Vietnam of aggression. At first due to a veto by one of the council's permanent members, the draft resolution – demanding strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States and calling on all foreign forces to observe a cease-fire, end hostilities and withdraw from Kampuchea – was not adopted. However, at the request of several Asian nations, the General Assembly took up the issue. The draft resolution now became a plea from the Assembly's side and it asked all nations and humanitarian and charitable organisations to render all kinds of relief and help to the war-torn Kampuchea. The United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) looked after more than 2.5 lakhs of people in the evacuation sites. It had tried to preserve a civilian atmosphere in the campsites and consolidate relief operations, improve health, nutrition and social welfare.

The basic cause of the failure of the United Nations to fulfill the high hopes of its promoters is the conflict between the two superpowers. Morgenthau says, 'The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has prevented the United Nations from becoming the international government of the great powers which the charter intended it to be.' Another writer says that the roots of the failure of the United Nations, 'lie deeply embedded in nationalism, sovereignty, and nation-state psychology, and also in the perversities of the human race'. The persistent strength of Nationalism is certainly one of the major factors in the failure of the UN. Being an organisation of sovereign states, the UN has to respect rights and sentiments; it has no independent authority to pass laws and to enforce its will by force.