International Relations | Practice Test / Quiz / MCQs

Home > CompTIA A+ Exam > Quizzes > International Relations

International Relations

Fast practice, instant feedback. Timer auto-submits when time’s up.

Avg score: 4% • Most missed: “shadow of the future”

Study First Challenge a Friend Stats

International Relations

Time left 00:00

25 Questions

1. nuclear taboo

Some cooperation may be present at the beginning of war but states will be reluctant to fully integrate their war fighting abilities -once states begin to lose battles they will seek to change things up -these reforms will lead to greater rather than less cooperation among wartime partnersRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of war

2. the international system according to liberals

Not as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warSome cooperation may be present at the beginning of war but states will be reluctant to fully integrate their war fighting abilities -once states begin to lose battles they will seek to change things up -these reforms will lead to greater rather than less cooperation among wartime partnersRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a norm

3. 3 types of effects of norms

Some cooperation may be present at the beginning of war but states will be reluctant to fully integrate their war fighting abilities -once states begin to lose battles they will seek to change things up -these reforms will lead to greater rather than less cooperation among wartime partnersNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of war

4. hypotheses

Regulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securitySome cooperation may be present at the beginning of war but states will be reluctant to fully integrate their war fighting abilities -once states begin to lose battles they will seek to change things up -these reforms will lead to greater rather than less cooperation among wartime partners

5. fourth world

Defense advantage- differentiation between offensive and defensive, so no security dilemma -doubly safeNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of war

6. how do institutions increase prospects for cooperation

Repeated interactions, reciprocity, and monitoring Institutions lower transaction costs -stable mutual expectations -side payments -provide information -monitor complianceRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of war

7. Thucydides

8. liberalism/ liberal authors/ different strands

Regulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normMain actors: states -main goal: liberal and economic order -main instrument: institutions and commerce -economic interdependence to avoid conflict -construct international institutions to combat selfish tendencies -recognize the role of power in international behavior -self determination -non-violence and conflict resolution -non zero sum -robert keohane, dale copeland, bruce russett -neoliberal institutionalism -economic interdependence -regime typeNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of war

9. economic interdependence

Creates a mutual value to countries -states can use their economic linkages to play chicken -the less dependent state has an incentive to coerce the other state -high interdependence help foster peace -according to realists, interdependence will only increase the chance of war as states seek to reduce the vulnerability that dependence brings -interdependence can lead to both peace and war -realism- trade and investment flows can lead to peace by giving states an incentive to avoid conflicts and warA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and security

10. snyder

11. prisoners dilemma

A metaphor for understanding why cooperation is difficult in the international system -PD- type situations capture the kind of collective goods problem common to IR -game explains why cooperation can fail to occur in international systems -preference ordering: DC (A 25, B free) >CC (1 year each) >DD (10 years each) >CD (A free, B 25)Regulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and security

12. anarchy

A shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normAnarchy means self-help -what one state does affects everyone else, so the reactions of other states have to be taken into account -the absence of political authority -international politics or the international system is said to be anarchic as there is no world government- no central or superordinate authority over states, which retain their sovereign rights

13. oye

Not as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warMitigating anarchy -shadow of the future -the conditions for cooperation in world politicsRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a norm

14. first world

Regulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normNo way to be secure without menacing others and security through defense is hard to maintain- attacking is the best route -doubly dangerousNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of war

15. wendt

Not as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityConstructivist -structural constructivism -anarchy is what states make of itA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a norm

16. constructivism/ constructivist authors/ different strands

A shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityMain actors: individuals -main goal: varies -main instrument: ideas and discourse -strong elite influence -pays respect to the specific interests and culture of a state -the role of social norms in sovereignty and state power -ideas will be more powerful if supported by strong states -analyze how identities change -constructivists argue that states construct the security dilemma and can choose not to fall to it -use ideas and verbal debate -alex wendt, john mueller, nina tannonwald -north american -european

17. offense-defense theory

War is more likely when nations can easily dominate each other -offensive advantage means it is easier to attack another state -defensive advantage means it is easier to protect your own land -if a state has to spend one more dollar than another state on defense, it has the defensive advantage, and vice versa for offense -the advantage can be determined by geology and technology -geology- flat vs. mountainous, landlocked vs. island, has large powers around it- Germany and UK -technology- weapons -nuclear weapons are neither- they are deterrents -cannot characterize a state has offense or defense- only policies and actionsA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a norm

18. physic and physical costs of war

Not as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warPsychic- war is repulsive, immoral and uncivilized -physical- war is bloody, destructive, and expensive

19. structural realism

Regulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normProperties of the international system- anarchy -properties of the units in the system -states are the main actors -states are like units- distribution of capabilities and relative power -states are unitary actors -basic goal of all states is to survive -intentions not knownA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and security

20. second world

Offense and defense cannot be distinguished, and the defense has the advantage- security policies can be established -security dilemmaNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of war

21. logic of appropriateness

A shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityThe taboo could enter the decision making process instrumentally in the form of a perceived cost, manifesting itself as an exogenously given constraint on decision making -the taboo become widespread and pervasive- no longer attached only to actors to hold it

22. mearsheimer

Anarchy and the struggle for power -offensive realist -believes that power states want more than just security- want to be a hegemon -relative power and the amount of power a state has in the present day and will have in the future is difficult to tell -no amount of cooperation can eliminate dominance and the security dilemma -as long as states remain anarchic, peace is not likelyNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a norm

23. structural realism (neo realism)

A shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a normNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityWaltz -properties of the international system- anarchy -properties of the units in the system -states are the main actors -states are like units- distribution of capabilities and relative power -states are unitary actors -basic goal of all states is to survive -intentions not known -states are not power maximizers -balance of power: the process by which states counterbalance to ensure that no single state dominates the system, or an outcome that establishes a rough equilibrium -pursue security by either an internal balancing (arms), or external balancing (allies) -polarity- uni, bi-, or multi-polarity

24. waltz

Theory of international politics -man, the state, and war realist thought and non-realist theoryNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityA shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a norm

25. consequences of anarchy

A shared expectation about behavior -normative prohibition against nuclear weapons -de-legitimize nuclear weapons as weapons of warFear and uncertainty -security dilemma -conflictNot as a structure, but a process -actors are international organizations and international corporations -Locke- more cooperation is possible, individuals are endowed with natural rights -system is anarchic, but not a constant state of war -relations between states are not always zero-sum -cooperation is possible -internal characteristics matter for international behavior -states have aims that go beyond survival and securityRegulative: -impose costs -against using nuclear weapons first | Constitutive: -feels wrong -boundaries with implications for behavior and identity| permissive: -other behaviors become more common -a subset a constitutive effects -unintended consequences of the operation of a norm

⚡ Recently practiced quizzes in this topic

Live quiz activity

Comptia A+ Port Numbers CompTIA A+ Windows Command Line A+ Guide To IT Technical Support Glossary CompTIA A+ Certification 802 Exam Practice CompTIA A+ 220-801 Exam A+ Guide To IT Technical Support - Network Hardware CompTIA A+ 220-901 Exam Practice Questions CompTIA A+ 220-901 Practice Questions Comptia A+ 220-902 Exam Terms A+ Guide To IT Technical Support - Hard Drives and Other Storage Devices

25 Questions

❤ If you liked Fatskills, consider supporting us by checking out The Life Manuals You Never Got.

About | Explore | User Guide | Topics | Subjects | Doubt Solver | Career Aptitude Test | Answers | Free Tools | What Should We Know?
Privacy | Terms |

Without work one finishes nothing. - Ralph Waldo Emerson
© 2026 Fatskills.com

All trademarks, logos and brand names are the property of their respective owners. All company, product and service names used in this website are for identification purposes only. Use of these names, trademarks and brands does not imply endorsement.

25 Questions

❤ If you liked Fatskills, consider supporting us by checking out The Life Manuals You Never Got.

About | Explore | User Guide | Topics | Subjects | Doubt Solver | Career Aptitude Test | Answers | Free Tools | What Should We Know? Privacy | Terms |

Without work one finishes nothing. - Ralph Waldo Emerson© 2026 Fatskills.com

All trademarks, logos and brand names are the property of their respective owners. All company, product and service names used in this website are for identification purposes only. Use of these names, trademarks and brands does not imply endorsement.

About | Explore | User Guide | Topics | Subjects | Doubt Solver | Career Aptitude Test | Answers | Free Tools | What Should We Know?
Privacy | Terms |

Without work one finishes nothing. - Ralph Waldo Emerson
© 2026 Fatskills.com